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 Contemporary Nativism Motivated by Mathematics 
Annaliese Mugele 
Part I: Introduction  
As one learns more about the world, it becomes increasingly clearer that mathematics is 
worked into the fabric of it, an underlying factor in nearly everything involving life. In the study 
of philosophy, innateness immediately struck my interest, given its connection to mathematics.  
How we understand what we know, how we come to know it, and what we can know would be 
impacted if we reached a consensus on whether or not there is innate knowledge or structures 
inherently built into our minds.  When one considers how we naturally learn and wonder about 
mathematics, it is clear that it is a different learning process than with other material.  I 
remember thinking about infinity at a young age, only to academically learn about it in college. 
As one progresses in philosophical studies, it’s evident that mathematics is often used as support 
in arguments. As innateness is one of the most classic philosophical issues, fascinating uses of 
mathematics can be found in these arguments as well. 
My first exposure to innateness, and perhaps the most famous perspective put forth, is 
Locke’s Tabula Rasa argument. This “blank slate” idea has now become archaic and even strong 
contemporary empiricists would not argue for it. There has been a shift in the empiricist-nativist 
debate in favor of nativism. Many contemporary nativist arguments are being published with 
fascinating, coherent ideas that can truly rival those of empiricists. I will focus on those 
contemporary nativist arguments that are motivated by mathematics.  Part of the reason this 
debate has been going for so long is because of the huge implications that would follow about 
the nature and structure of the mature human mind if a conclusion was to ever be reached. The 
use of mathematics to successfully argue for innateness would not only be substantial for 
 nativism, but also for society’s understanding of mathematics.  In this paper, I will summarize 
and analyze Locke’s Tabula Rasa argument. Then, after providing brief historical background on 
the contemporary empiricist-nativist debate, I will compare Locke’s Tabula Rasa argument to 
contemporary nativist arguments and highlight the prevalence and distinctive philosophical 
relevance of mathematics as a key focal feature of a number of these arguments. 
 
Part II: Locke’s Tabula Rasa Argument  
In “Book 1: Innate Ideas Essay 1: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Locke 
is trying to uncover what the human condition allows us to know. He believes human 
understanding is intimately connected to his project. Inquiring about our understanding naturally 
leads to questions about the origin of ideas, and Locke defines ideas as whatever is the object of 
the understanding when a man thinks. He begins to try to uncover how ideas come into the mind.  
 He first focuses on innate ideas. Innate ideas are primary notions which the mind receives 
when it first comes into existence, and that it brings into the world with it. Colors, everyone 
would agree, are not innate because we cannot know about or imagine the color blue until we see 
it. Off the bat, he claims that it would be unreasonable to explain knowledge as innate when we 
could easily have come to know it in ordinary ways.  Then he explicitly states that he believes 
none of our intellectual possessions are innate. Before considering another line of reasoning, 
Locke delves into an argument focusing on universal assent.  
Locke’s first major flaw is that he does not give a reason why he is exploring universal 
assent as the criterion for innateness besides stating that other people have used it. Furthermore, 
in his essay, he does not explore any other criterion. This clear disregard to form a complete 
argument almost entirely discounts his conclusions from the start. 
  Locke then explores the proposition that maxims are generally assented to as soon as they 
are proposed and the terms they are proposed in are understood. He responds by asking if quick 
agreement to a proposition is a clear mark of an innate idea. This cannot be the criterion. He 
agrees that a proposition is shown to be self-evident if it is promptly assented to by everyone 
who hears it and understands its terms, but self-evidence comes from a source other than 
innateness.  Also, according to the innatists’ principles, all these native beams of light, if they 
existed, would shine out most brightly in people who are not skilled in concealing things, 
showing that they have innate ideas. But, he claims, children, idiots, etc. know no general 
maxims. Their ideas are few and narrow, and only come from things they use the most in their 
lives which have strongly and frequently been impressed on their senses.  
 This is an interesting thought and opens up a deeper discussion. Should innateness be 
more apparent in some more than others, and if so, who? The answer to this question turns on 
whether or not innateness should be equal in everyone. I tend to believe it is. Therefore, I think 
that an “equal level of innateness” would suggest that it would not be more apparent in anyone. 
Furthermore, against Locke’s point, there is no way to detect or quantify innateness, for if there 
was, the empiricist-nativist debate would be concluded. 
He presents another argument: if there are any ideas – innate or not – in a mind at a time 
when the mind is not actually thinking of them, they must be in the memory. Locke claims that 
to have an idea be brought to the forefront of a conscious mind is for that idea to be remembered. 
To remember something is to perceive it with a consciousness that one has known before. So, if 
there were any innate ideas they must only be in the memory. Yet no one can remember an idea 
that they have never had experience with, for it goes against the definition of remembering. 
 Although Locke’s claims about memory are true, he seems to be implying that innate 
ideas would need to be in the conscious mind at all times, and this is a misunderstanding. Rather, 
an innate idea would be stored like any other kind of knowledge, not necessarily always being 
perceived. Memory in the context of knowledge is notably different than memory in the context 
of an experience. When a claim is made, all the learning that took place to reach that conclusion 
is not at once brought to the front of the mind. For example, to make the claim, “Dolphins and 
fish both live underwater” I do not recall when I first learned what these animals are or that they 
are different species. These are not thoughts I am consciously having but they are in my mind 
when I make that claim. Memory in the context of an experience, though, involves remembering 
as many details of the experience as possible and bringing those details into your conscious 
mind.  Thus, I think Locke’s argument here is more or less useless.  
Locke concludes by putting a “chief emphasis” on the fact that we have to work for 
knowledge and cannot expect it to be handed to us. He even goes so far as to suggest that the 
notion of innate ideas and blind credulity make a person easier to be controlled and manipulated, 
especially to those in positions of power. Something Locke fails to address, that may affect his 
conclusion, is the distinction between intellectual ideas and intellectual structures. His arguments 
focus solely on intellectual ideas. This is understandable, though, given Locke’s time period. 
Only relatively recently have we learned more about the structures of the mind and have 
gathered empirical evidence. So, it is fair that he did not consider them. This recent collection of 
empirical data has had large effects on the empiricist-nativist debate. 
 
Part III: Historical Overview 
  Firstly, it is important to note what belief set defines one as an empiricist or a nativist. 
The authors of The Innate Mind believe that the core contrast between the two turns on the 
number, variety, and nature of the psychological structures that are posited to explain cognitive 
development from infancy to the mature state. More simply, the disagreement is over the nature 
of the psychological structures that are needed to explain the development of the mind. A nativist 
believes that the innate basis of the mind is rich and diverse while an empiricist believes that the 
innate basis of the mind is scant and uniform. As a result, a nativist will usually think that a 
child’s mind is an extremely complex thing because of the large number of psychological 
structures. An empiricist, though, likely believes there are a few of these structures which are 
sufficient to generate the full richness of the human mind. Taking this stance, empiricists may 
argue two ways: the diverse mechanisms and information that nativists believe to be present is 
acquired through only the few general learning systems that they posit, or they may deny that the 
adult mind is as rich as nativists claim. As a result, there are arguments not only over the nature 
and structure of the mature human mind, but also the starting point of cognitive development. So, 
both nativist and empiricist views allow varying degrees of belief in the different types of 
independent structures that one may assert to be innate. This makes it possible for one to hold 
nativist beliefs about some parts of the mind and empiricist beliefs about others. 
These degrees within each position lead to views on innateness being formed into a sort 
of spectrum. It has not always been that way though. Historically, empiricists have held very 
stark views of the mind. More recently, the debate has shifted significantly towards nativism. So, 
empiricists now argue for positions closer to the nativist end of the spectrum than their empiricist 
predecessors. Likewise, nativists now argue for even greater complexity within the psychological 
structures they posit. A reason for this shift may be the development of the accumulator model.  
 Laurence and Margolis, in their paper, “Linguistic Determinism and the Innate Basis of 
Number,” which will be discussed later, say, 
This strongly suggests not only that the underlying system of representation lacks the 
precision of natural numbers but also that its representations are the mental magnitudes 
associated with the accumulator. . . The current consensus in psychology is that the 
accumulator is a ubiquitous cognitive system with an evolutionary ancient history. But to 
embrace the accumulator as part of the innate structure of the mind is to take a good step 
away from an empiricist model of numerical cognition (143). 
This shift towards nativism serves as evidence of the strength of contemporary nativism. Despite 
this, empiricist thought continues to dominate Anglo-American universities.  
 This shift in the spectrum highlights the longevity of the debate over innateness. The 
longevity can be explained by considering the implications of a resolution. If a universally 
agreed upon conclusion came about, it would determine the nature and structure of the mature 
human mind. This would affect not only how we study the mind, but also how we educate 
society and how we may increase efficiencies in an array of subject areas.  
 Samuels points to three main indicators of the confusion of innateness in his essay “Is 
Innateness a Confused Concept?” He names three features that show there is confusion inherent 
in the discussion of the concept of innateness. These features are cross talk, fallacious 
argumentation, and failure of convergence. Fallacious argumentation refers to implausible and 
irrelevant objections and arguments sometimes added into debates. The failure of convergence is 
especially interesting because despite decades of research and mutually accessible data, there has 
been little convergence of opinion.   
  Nativists and empiricist views can differ in a few key ways, and a philosophical stance 
can even exist as a combination of the two. The debate between these camps over innateness has 
failed to come to a conclusion for a long time. Despite this, the spectrum between the two camps 
has shifted, indicating that there has been progress made by contemporary nativists. Let’s now 
explore examples of this progress, focusing on arguments that use the tool of math. 
 
Part IV: Contemporary Nativist Arguments: (A) “Where Integers Come From”  
 Two strong contemporary nativist papers that use mathematics as the foundation of their 
innateness are “Where Integers Come From” by Alan Leslie et al. and “Linguistic Determinism 
and the Innate Basis of Number” by Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis. In this section, I will 
simultaneously summarize and defend these arguments.  
 Alan Leslie et al.’s argument is one of the most cohesive accounts for the foundation of 
integers being innate, I believe, we have available. The authors posit that the basis of our natural 
number concepts is the innate representation “S” that recursively defines the positive integers 
and the concept of next. They reach this conclusion by using recent empirical research on 
cognitive features. This research adds strength to the authors arguments that a philosopher could 
not have had in Locke’s era. To reach this conclusion, the authors do work to understand the 
basis of our quantitative representations and then search through possible explanations. They 
finally put forth and support their own proposal.  
The authors first explore number words and their role in this search. They immediately 
highlight that the use of “one,” “two,” and “three” means exactly one, exactly two, etc. In this 
way natural number words are quite different than color terms, which refer to a range of values. 
Count numbers are not vague in the way that “blue” indicates blue-ish. They conclude by 
 claiming that when preschool children identify that the meaning for a given lexical item may be a 
numerical value –during an activity such as counting – they expect that word to denote some 
positive integer value. If the restricted hypothesis space that preschool children were accessing 
was made up of real numbers, there is an infinitesimal chance of selecting a positive integer. This 
is because in the real numbers, the chance of selecting “2” is one in infinity, because there are 
infinitely many real numbers. So, if this was the case, then there would never be language for 
natural numbers, for the odds of selecting natural numbers are so small they approach zero. 
 I think that this point is especially interesting. Most properties of objects come in the 
form of a range, such as color, height, and angle. The count of a set, certainly a property of it, is 
always a discrete integer number. It is worthwhile to explore why numerical values are different. 
Everyone, including children, understand counts in the form of whole numbers. One does not 
count “2.1, 3.5, 6.7” even though these numbers are increasing. Furthermore, even if the 
numbers were evenly spaced, there is no apparent reason to count “1, 2, 3” opposed to “1.5, 2.5, 
3.5.” One can see that if the possible values for count numbers were any of the real numbers, it 
has been proved by the law of excluded middle, there is virtually no chance natural numbers 
would be selected. 
Next, Leslie et al. elaborate on the importance of the exact equality of integers. Two 
measurements of the same continuous physical quantity will be the same twice only by error 
because it is impossible in principle to determine the value of a continuous quantity with exact 
precision. On the other hand, counting is a fundamental use of integers, and we depend on the 
resulting cardinal value of a count to be able to be found again when recounting. This is a, not 
often noted, but important fundamental difference between real and natural numbers. 
 A pivotal piece of the argument revolves around magnitude representations. A magnitude 
representation refers to the brain representing numbers not as discrete symbols but as continuous 
quantities. The authors cite evidence that leads us to the conclusion that there exists an 
underlying representation in the form of a noisy real-valued magnitudes. The best-developed 
model of the magnitude representation is the “accumulator” model of Meck and Church (1983). 
This will be an important model that they cite throughout the rest of the paper. 
Note that the best way to attack these authors’ conclusions would be to attack their 
assumption of the use of this model. Looking ahead to the second paper I will discuss, we can 
find other evidence for the validity of this model. Laurence and Margolis cite the accumulator 
model as the “current consensus in psychology,” and without going into talk of Kuhn and 
paradigm shifts, it is best to accept the current model within the scientific discipline.  
The accumulator can measure continuous time intervals (in “run” mode) or count discrete 
entities (in “event” mode). The accumulator model alone, though, makes it hard to see why our 
basic number concepts should be integers rather than reals. One issue is that there is nothing in 
the account that explains why each discrete value added to the accumulator should equal exactly 
one rather than some real number, possibly varying around one. Similarly, accumulated values 
will be noisy and never equal to exact integer values. The values stored in memory will be noisy 
and continuously variable. Any numerical observations that a learner makes in the course of 
quantifying will take place in a vocabulary of the reals. This could explain the “noisy” nature of 
color words. The authors conclude this section wondering if the accumulator magnitudes can be 
translated into or constrained to integer values.  
Accepting the accumulator model and the assumption of an underlying representation of 
numbers in the form of a noisy real-valued magnitudes, the authors explore what this connection 
 to integer values could be. It is very tempting to turn to language and number words. I would 
have hypothesized that the solution lies here. The authors show that it does not and then turn to a 
different understanding of object perception. Yet, this account fails to explain the connection as 
well. In the following paragraphs I will summarize those arguments. 
 Looking at language, the authors work through an argument situated on the fact that it is 
tempting to say that we learn number words constrained to integer values because physical 
objects are typically the things that get counted with the number words. But, whatever the 
discreteness of a “whole” object means, it does not disclose a number. So, even in the co-
presence of objects and the count words, children would entertain non-integer-values for the 
meaning of the count words and would never consider an integer value as a candidate referent. 
So, language does not solve the issue at hand. 
 Now the authors turn to the concept of “object files,” which accounts for a missing link in 
traditional accounts of object perception. Object files are temporary object representations that 
interface between sensory information and long-term semantic information. There is an indexing 
function, which is like a folder labeled with spatiotemporal coordinates that point at the object it 
refers to. There is also a function of having further information added, taken away, or changed. 
These are the papers within the folder, each having some property “written” on it. An object file 
may or may not contain a feature bundle, but it must at least have an index. So, can object 
indexes represent numerosity? No. Children may be able to detect numerosity changes simply by 
distinctly remembering each individual in the set, but all this does is demonstrate their 
commitment to object permanence. Sets of object files do not and cannot refer to the numerosity 
that they instantiate. Because the first step in the proposed bootstrap is flawed in this way, we are 
lead down a path of question begging if we continue. The indexing function of object files 
 provides no help at all in understanding where integers come from. Furthermore, the authors 
come to the conclusion that there is no account on hand which shows how a young child can 
inductively construct integer representations where none where available before.   
 The largest take away from these failed solutions is that an emphasis needs to be placed 
on computational compatibility. Computational compatibility refers to the fact that symbols are 
not numerical unless they enter into arithmetic processing. So, in any explanation for how the 
mind represents numbers, there must also be an explanation for how the symbols that represent 
continuous values and discrete values can be used within the same athematic system. A problem 
with any hypothesis that posits a special discrete representation for the integers, a representation 
that is fundamentally different from and unrelated to the representation of continuous quantities, 
is the problem of computational compatibility. 
Finally, the authors bring about their own proposal. They propose that the basis of our 
natural number concepts is the innate representation S that recursively defines the positive 
integers and the concept next. The basis of these concepts cannot be a system of continuous 
magnitude representations, accumulator or connectionist, noisy or not, without a system that can 
represent exactly the value 1. Moreover, the integer representation becomes calibrated to 
accumulator magnitudes, allowing integer calculation and magnitude estimation. What natural 
language cannot do is determine or teach anew the meanings of integer concepts. These 
meanings are known in an important sense innately: namely as generated by S and perhaps even 
calibrated against the magnitude representation.  
In addition to accumulator magnitudes and object indexes, the authors believe that we 
should assume the existence of a third representational system which represents only integer 
values. In this proposal, the accumulator model serves a role not as the end-all-be-all source of 
 integers but as the main mechanism for rapid understanding of numerical calculation and 
estimation. So, the integer representation and the continuous magnitude representation have to be 
computationally compatible. The authors propose that both the accumulator magnitude 
representations and the integer representations have to be innately specified. 
 Look to a speedometer as an example of real and natural numbers calibrated to each 
other. Both have ordinal structure, but only the integers support a well-defined notion of “next 
number.” This notion of next is integral to our basic number intuitions. The accumulator model 
has a decent way to pick out the next mental magnitude. This “next” mental magnitude you get is 
the same as when you add “1” to the mental continuous magnitude you have. This next 
magnitude, though, is not excused from the fact that two measured continuous magnitudes will 
never be the same. So, any two samplings of “next” numbers will never be exactly equal. But, it 
is argued that the mechanism for deciding whether one mental magnitude is greater than another 
should be assumed to have a function of “effectively equal.” This brings the conversation back to 
the question of exact equality and away from discrete ordering. An accumulator-continuous 
magnitude counting mechanism with an “effectively equal” operation will be able to discretely 
order the magnitudes it generates, and this will solve that problem.  
 But there is more to the idea of “next number” than just ordering and exactness. We must 
look to the fact that any greater value does not work. The “next” integer value can only come 
about by adding “1.”  In the accumulator model, it is specified that the count value to be added is 
effectively equal to 1. Notice that no other value besides 1 works as a multiplicative identity 
element.  
 This line of thought brings about the realization that mapping integers to mental 
magnitudes numbers is constrained by formal considerations in a way that mapping from real 
 numbers to mental magnitudes is not. This constraint, along with the need for computational 
compatibility, imposes a system of natural units on mental magnitudes.  The intervals on the 
mental number line that correspond to successive increments map discrete quantity to mental 
magnitudes. Furthermore, these intervals must be exactly equal to the interval that functions as 
the multiplicative identity, namely 1.  
 I have never thought of 1 like this before. Working heavily with math, the uniqueness and 
importance of 1 has always stood out, but the connection between the difference between “next” 
orderings of integers and the fact that it is the multiplicative identity element is new to me. This 
makes sense though, and with independent thought it becomes clear that a system of arithmetic 
reasoning will not work if this is not the case. 
 The authors propose that there is a minimal mechanism that will generate the entire 
integer series and support arithmetic inference. They suggest an integer generator that, similar to 
the accumulator model, functions as a mechanism of domain-specific learning. Secondly, this 
integer generator has the function that the values it generates can be calibrated to the 
accumulator model, taking care of the issue of computational compatibility. Thirdly, it allows an 
unbounded set of discrete values to be represented, either providing or learning a notational 
system with an unbounded set of symbols. Also, it only represents integer values. Finally, it must 
guarantee an ordering of values under the aforementioned “next” relation. These requirements 
can be summarized in the following assumptions given by the authors: 
1. There is at least one innately given symbol with an integer value, namely ONE=1. 
2. There is an innately given recursive rule S(x) = x + ONE.  
3. There is a regular grid that is commensurate with, and can be calibrated to, the 
accumulator values. 
 The authors then touch on the importance of compact notation, where the symbols do not grow 
to the size of the integer they represent. Additionally, it is important to note that the addition 
operation, identity relation, algebraic variables, and recursive capacity must also be innately 
realized. 
 I find this proposal to be very convincing because it makes sense and covers everything 
necessary in the least extensive requirements for innateness. This, I believe, makes it highly 
plausible. Furthermore, the authors admit that this proposal can only be put forward in a tentative 
voice for obvious reasons. We cannot know the truth of the innateness of mathematics, all we 
can do is postulate. This is a very respectable fact to include. 
 
Part IV: Contemporary Nativist Arguments: (B) “Linguistic Determinism and the Innate 
Basis of Number”  
 The second paper I examined was “Linguistic Determinism and the Innate Basis of 
Number” by Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis. Laurence and Margolis note the emerging 
consensus as favoring empiricists and weak nativists, who consider natural numbers a cultural 
construct such as writing and agriculture, while suggesting strong nativism, the opposing thesis, 
is wrong. The authors believe that a particular study by Peter Gordon had a large impact on the 
shift toward this consensus. It was a high-profile cross-cultural study of number concepts among 
the Pirahã tribe in the Amazon. In their paper, they look at the implications of Gordon’s study 
and argue that Gordon’s experiments don’t give support for either view and therefore they do not 
diminish the prospects for strong nativism. In addition, they provide a brief sketch of their own 
views which fall under those of strong nativism. 
  Laurence and Margolis also discuss the aforementioned accumulator model in their 
section on the history of nativist theorizing. On the accumulator model, they say, “So while the 
accumulator may represent numerical quantity, it lacks the precision that is integral to the natural 
numbers” (142) and also “The current consensus in psychology is that the accumulator is 
ubiquitous cognitive system with an evolutionarily ancient history” (143).  In this historical 
section, the authors also talk about object-indexing system which Leslie et al. explored.  
 The authors briefly sketch their own approach to a strong nativist proposal for the basis 
of natural numbers. They posit that one of the core systems supporting natural number concepts 
is an innate number module which contributes a small set of representations that correspond to 
the first few integers – 1, 2, 3, and maybe 4. The representations have exact numerical content, 
yet it is minimal. The number modules are numerical representations in the sense that they serve 
to detect collections of specific sizes. They need not contain an understanding of the quantitative 
relations among small collections or knowledge of mathematical facts and functions. The authors 
suggest that the number modules do not even need to be understood as ordered. 
 This view is quite different that the one put forth by Leslie et al. mainly due to its 
complexity. Laurence and Margolis’s proposal features the use of object-indexing or a similar 
system, which as you can recall, Leslie et al. ruled out of possibility. Looking deeper, though, 
remember that Leslie et al. ruled out the use of an object-indexing system because instead of 
detecting numerosity changes with numbers, it simply highlighted a commitment to object 
permanence. Laurence and Margolis’s view controls this symptom of an object-indexing system. 
They require their innate number modules to be numerical representations in the sense that they 
serve to detect collections of specific sizes. Therefore, their argument stands up against Leslie et 
al.’s argument against object-indexing as a solution. 
  Additionally, notice that Laurence and Margolis do not necessitate their number modules 
to be understood as ordered. The ordering of the integers seems to take place innately in a neural 
network they posit where the 2 output node can inhibit the 1 output node and the 3 output node 
can inhibit both the 1 and 2 output nodes. They are not asserting that this is the only way to use 
their proposed number modules. How would ordering fit into another scenario?  We cannot 
know from what we are given in this paper. So, while the notion of “next” does not seem to bare 
huge importance in this proposal, remember that it is more or less the foundation of Leslie et 
al.’s proposal.   It is easy to think the most important use of a number is to determine the 
numerosity of a set, but the numerosity of a set is useless information if you do not have the 
capacity to compare it to another numerosity. The ability to order and compare numbers is where 
their value lies, not simply in labeling a property of a set. Thus, Laurence and Margolis’s 
proposal falls short of Leslie et al.’s because they do not account for the significance of “next.”  
 There are other things to object to in their proposal. First, it is odd to require so many 
innate natural numbers. The authors give no reason for why 1, 2, 3, and maybe 4 are innate or 
why the innateness of 4 is not decided.  They also believe that from these numbers, we are able 
to detect the importance of 1 in our numerical system, namely the fact that it separates each 
natural number and is the multiplicative identity element. I think that three or four natural 
numbers are not enough to lead us to that conclusion or detect any pattern. 
 Second, to posit that these number modules are innately precise and have the feature of 
being understood to be a representation of a number of things in a set is a lot to ask. I think 
innateness is better understood as explaining things we cannot seem to explain in the simplest 
way possible. This is not that. If we have no way of knowing what is innate and what is not 
innate, I think that we should be striving to form nativist theories that use as little innate pieces 
 of knowledge necessary. Note that this would not be weak nativism because I still believe that 
concepts for specific natural numbers cannot simply be learnt or a product of culture. 
 For those reasons, I believe that although Laurence and Margolis’s view in conjunction 
with their proposed neural network cover all the necessary components, it falls short of a concise 
simplicity that may be the most important part of a nativist theory. Thus, Leslie et al.’s proposal 
remains the more likely. 
 
Part V: Relevance and Prevalence of Mathematics 
 I believe that mathematics, specifically the set of natural numbers, is relevant and 
prevalent in the discussion of nativism because it is a likely candidate for innate knowledge as 
well as for the use of innate structures. Children grasp the idea of infinity more quickly than they 
do of fractions (Leslie 138). Why is it that “counting forever,” or infinity, comes naturally to 
children, while division into parts needs curriculum and examples such as pizza pies? This 
speaks not only to the high importance of integers over real numbers for the debate about 
innateness, but also to the importance of mathematics in this debate.  Children have a curiosity 
about inaccessible pieces of mathematical knowledge such as infinity or a perfect triangle, but at 
the same time have difficulty grasping fractions and long division. Our relationship with 
mathematics is unique because of this.  
By means of mathematics, philosophers have been able to develop sophisticated and 
compelling notions about the nature of innateness.  How can children grasp infinity or a perfect 
triangle, concepts we can never experience, yet come to on our own accord? We have found no 
answer. The elusiveness as well as the concreteness of mathematics makes it a wonderful 
candidate to support nativism over empiricism.  
  
Part VI: Conclusion  
The nativist-empiricist debate has been going on for hundreds of years, and for good 
reason. If a conclusion was reached, it would have implications across the board ranging from 
our cognitive understanding, neurological development, and how we go about education. 
Furthermore, it is only in recent years that we have been able to have empirical evidence about 
our neurological structures as well as a greater collection of data from psychological, 
sociological, and neurological studies. As a result, the academic debate has shifted towards 
nativism, despite Anglo-American universities continuing to lean towards more empirical works. 
I tend to lean towards nativist views and believe Leslie et al.’s paper “Where Integers 
Come From” puts forth the best proposal for how we acquire our concepts of integers. After 
exploring many proposed solutions, they settle on a set of three assumptions requiring 
innateness. Comparing this to Laurence and Margolis’ paper in support of a strong nativist 
proposal for our acquisition of integers, Leslie et al.’s argument continued to hold up as a better 
suited solution. Leslie et al.’s argument is so important because it can serve as an argument for 
the existence of innateness in general, using mathematics to do so.  
Mathematics often is used as a key feature in arguments in either camp because it 
underlays almost everything we do with a surety and concreteness that nothing else gives. At the 
same time, though, it is mystifying how we come to these concepts so easily, some of which, 
such as infinity and a perfect triangle, we can never experience.  
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